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During the last decade a growing number of commentators in the public media have
argued that recent economic and technological developments, such as increased inter-
national competition, labor market deregulation, and the rise of the internet, have
increased job insecurity in developed countries and have thereby made some groups in
society worse oﬀ. There is a widely held view that this increase in insecurity has been
caused both by an increase in the probability of job separation for given employment
arrangements and also byas h i f tt o w a r d sm o r eﬂexible, and intrinsically more instable,
employment arrangements.1 In this paper we present a model of the labor market that
is consistent with these developments.
A number of recent studies have shown that, at least in some countries and for
some groups of workers, job insecurity was higher in the 1990s than the 1980s. For
France, for intance, Givord and Maurin (2003) ﬁnd evidence that job security was
”structurally lower in the 1990s than the 1980s.” Similarly, Bergemann and Mertens
(2001) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in job instability in the late 1980s and early 1990s
in Germany. The evidence for the US appears to be more mixed than that for some
Western European countries. Nevertheless, there are a number of papers that provide
evidence for an increase in job insecurity for some groups of American workers in
the 1990s. For instance, Neumark (2001) summarizes the evidence emerging from a
collection of papers that investigate the US case as follows:
“Overall, my reading of the evidence [on job insecurity and instability in the US] is
that the 1990s have witnessed some changes in the employment relationship consistent
with weakened bonds between workers and ﬁrms. Although the magnitudes of these
changes sometimes suggest sharp breaks with the recent past, they nonetheless indicate
that these bonds have been only weakened, not broken. Furthermore, the changes that
occurred in the 1990s have not persisted long enough even to earn the label “trends.”
This makes it at least as plausible, based on what we know at this point, to conclude
1For instance, in an article entitled “The End of Jobs for Life?”, The Economist (1998) writes:
“The alleged decline in job tenure is usually blamed on three factors: globalisation, technological
change and labour-market deregulation. Fiercer foreign competition and the faster spread of new
technology are forcing ﬁrms to become more ﬂexible. In countries where laws do not make it diﬃcult
to do so, the critics moan, companies adapt by ﬁring staﬀ more often and relying more on temporary
or casual workers.” For a more recent article along these lines see “The Sink-or-Swim Economy”,
The New York Times, June 8, 2003. See also the many references in McLaren and Newman (2002).
1that these changes are the unique product of changes in the corporate world in the
1990s rather than longer-term developments that will necessarily persist or accelerate
in the near future.”
Finally, there are also a number of papers that employ survey data and show that
large groups of workers perceive their current jobs to be more insecure than they were
in the past (Schmidt (1999), Scheve and Slaughter (2002)).
There is also some evidence that the way in which employment relationships are
structured has indeed become more ﬂexible. A number of authors have, for instance,
documented the remarkable growth of the temporary help services industry in the US
(Segal and Sullivan (1997), Autor, Levy, and Murnane (1999)). Since 1972 the em-
ployment in this industry has grown at an annual rate of 11%, increasing its share of
total employment in the US from 0.3% in 1972 to 1.8% in 1995. Between 1992 and
1995 employment growth in this industry accounted for approximately 10% of US em-
ployment growth. It has also been documented that in 1995 about 12 million workers
in the US, approximately 10% of the US labor force, were in ‘alternative employment
relationships,’ that is they worked as independent contractors, temporary help agency
workers, contract company workers, or on-call workers, without an expectation of
ongoing employment (Cohany (1996)).2 The shift towards more ﬂexible employment
relationships that these numbers suggest is not unique to the US. For France, Thesmar
and Thoenig (2002) report an increase in the share of total employment constituted
by workers hired under ﬁxed term contracts from 2% in 1982 to 6% in 1999. Among
workers with less than 6 months seniority the share increased from 17% in 1982 to
28% in 1999. Another piece of evidence that points towards more ﬂexible employ-
ment relationships is the major shift in pension coverage in the US over the last 20
years. Friedberg and Webb (2003) report that the share of full-time employees with
deﬁned contribution pension plans increased from 40% in 1983 to 79% in 1998 while
the share of full-time employees with deﬁned beneﬁts pension plans fell from 87% to
44%. A key diﬀerence between deﬁned beneﬁta n dd e ﬁned contribution pension plans
is that the former make it costly for workers to change employer by making the ben-
eﬁts increase disproportionately with tenure whereas the latter do not. Thus, a move
towards deﬁned contribution plans suggests a trend towards more ﬂexible employment
2Of the 12 million workers in alternative employment arrangements, 8.3 million worked as inde-
pendent contractors, 2 million as on call workers, 1.2 million as temporary help agency workers, and
650,000 as contract company employees (Cohany, 1996).
2relationships. While regulatory changes may play an important role in explaining the
shift in pension coverage, they are unlikely to be the only factor that contributed to
this development (Friedberg and Owyang (2002)).
W h i l et h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c et h a tj o bi n s ecurity has increased for some groups
of workers and that ﬁrms have adopted more ﬂexible employment relationships, the
underlying reasons for these changes are much less clear. In particular, there are very
few theoretical papers that identify the mechanisms through which these changes may
have occurred. The aim of this paper is to suggest one such mechanism. We start from
the premise that recent economic and technological changes have reduced labor market
frictions and thus made it easier for ﬁrms and workers to search for, and contract with,
alternative trading partners. We show that such a seemingly beneﬁcial change in the
economic environment can easily lead to more job insecurity and potentially reduce
the well being of those ﬁrms and workers who are currently in an employment relation-
ship. We then consider a possible organizational response by ﬁrms and workers to the
endogenous increase in job insecurity. We show that as market frictions are reduced
ﬁrms and workers have an incentive to switch from ‘rigid’ employment relationships,
in which it is very costly for them to change their current counterpart, to ‘ﬂexible’
ones, in which it is less costly for them to do so. This one oﬀ change in the structure
of the employment relationship leads to a large, one oﬀ increase in job insecurity and
unemployment.
More speciﬁcally, we consider a standard search model of the labor market in
which individual ﬁrms and workers meet randomly, negotiate a wage, and, in case of
agreement, start their productive relationship (see, for instance, Pissarides (2000)).
In contrast to the existing literature on search models of the labor market we assume
that wage bargaining between the ﬁrm and the worker is hindered by the presence of
private information. This may be the case, for instance, because the ﬁrm knows more
about its proﬁts than the worker or the worker knows more about her opportunity
costs than the ﬁrm. We make this assumption, which is central to our analysis, both
because we think that it is realistic and because it is well known in the labor literature
that bargaining ineﬃciencies can be an important cause of ineﬃcient job separations
(see Hall and Lazear (1984) and Hall (1995)).3 In particular, it is well known that
3While we follow Hall and Lazear (1984) in assuming that wage bargaining takes place in the
presence of private information, our analysis diﬀers from theirs in that we develop a general equilib-
rium model of the labor market and analyze the eﬀects of a reduction in search frictions on the wage
3when wage bargaining takes place in the presence of private information, the ﬁrm
and the worker bargain too aggressively and, as a result, often do not agree on a
wage although it would be eﬃcient for them to do so (see Hall and Lazear (1984)
and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). In a search model in which wage bargaining
takes place in the presence of private information a fall in labor market frictions has
ad i r e c tb e n e ﬁt for a worker and a ﬁrm who are negotiating a wage since it reduces
t h et i m en e c e s s a r yf o rt h e mt oﬁnd alternative trading partners in case they were
to disagree and separate (which happens with positive probability in equilibrium).
However, precisely because the cost of separation is reduced, the ﬁrm and the worker
bargain even more aggressively, which in turn increases the likelihood of separation.
Thus, once one allows for ineﬃcient wage bargaining, reductions in search frictions
c a nl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nj o bi n s e c u r i t yw h ich is ‘costly,’ in the sense that it has a
negative eﬀect on the expected joint surplus of a ﬁrm and a worker who are currently
in a relationship.4 We show that this negative insecurity eﬀect can dominate the direct
beneﬁt of a fall in search frictions and thus make the ﬁrm and its worker jointly worse
oﬀ.
Having established a straightforward channel through which a fall in labor market
frictions can lead to a costly increase in job insecurity we then extend our analysis
to investigate the organizational response to such a change in the economic environ-
m e n t .T od os ow ea l l o waﬁrm and a worker to contract over the ‘ﬂexibility’ of their
employment relationship before any private information is revealed. The degree of
ﬂexibility simply determines the extra costs that the ﬁrm and the worker incur in
case they separate in the future. In other words, we assume that a ﬁrm and a worker
can complement the exogenously given rigidities that they face in an imperfect labor
market with their own, ‘self-imposed rigidities’ that make it more costly for them to
separate in the future. We show that it is optimal for ﬁrms and workers to adopt a
rigid employment relationship if labor market frictions are above a certain threshold
and to adopt a ﬂexible employment relationship if l a b o rm a r k e tf r i c t i o n sa r eb e l o w
that threshold. Essentially, when labor markets work badly it is important for ﬁrms
bargaining process and on the structure of the employment relationship.
4In a standard search model with heterogeneous workers and in which wage bargaining takes place
under perfect information (see, for instance, Pissarides (2000)) a reduction in search frictions also
leads to more separations. Note, however, that these separations are always privately eﬃcient so that
the ﬁrm and the worker are made jointly better oﬀ b yaf a l li ns e a r c hf r i c t i o n s .
4and workers to ensure that their relationship does not break down easily and one way
to do this is to make separations costly. When labor markets work well, however,
separations are very likely to occur anyway and it then becomes important to reduce
the costs of these separations. Thus, as labor market frictions fall there is a one oﬀ
reorganization in which ﬁrms and workers switch from a rigid to a ﬂexible employment
relationship which, in turn, leads to a large, one oﬀ increase in job insecurity and in
the unemployment rate.
Our paper is related to recent contributions by McLaren and Newman (2002),
Ramey and Watson (2001), and Thesmar and Thoenig (2002). In McLaren and New-
man (2002) a fall in market frictions reduces the extent to which ﬁrms and workers are
willing to insure each other against idiosyncratic income shocks and thus increases the
degree of wage volatility. Ramey and Watson (2001) present a model in which a fall
in search frictions can lead to welfare losses. In their model ﬁr m sh a v et og i v ew o r k e r s
incentives to exert high eﬀort, and they can do so by investing in technologies that
increase the relative gains from exerting high eﬀo r to v e re x e r t i n gl o we ﬀort. Since,
all else equal, a fall in search frictions makes it less costly for workers to shirk, ﬁrms
have to compensate by increasing their initial investment, and this over-investment is
the source of welfare losses. Thesmar and Thoenig (2002) present a model in which
an increase in the use of outsourcing by industrial ﬁrms leads to an increase in the
volatility of labor demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the structure
of the model. In Section 3 we solve a benchmark version of the model in which there is
no private information at the wage bargaining stage. In Section 4 we solve the model
with private information and discuss the implications of an exogenous fall in market
frictions. In Section 5 we extend our basic model by endogenizing the organizational
structure of the employment relationship. Finally, in Section 6 we check the robustness
of our results to our assumptions on the bar g a i n i n gg a m e .W ed os ob ya l l o w i n gf o r
two-sided asymmetric information and ‘eﬃcient’ bargaining games.
2 The Model
We consider a dynamic market in which time is continuous and runs indeﬁnitely. All
agents are risk-neutral, liquidity unconstrained, and discount the future at rate r.
5There are two types of agents: ‘workers’ and ‘ﬁrms.’ At every point in time an
exogenous mass n of new workers is born. Every worker enters the labor market
as unemployed and searches for a job. As long as the worker remains unemployed
he receives utility ﬂow b per unit time. If instead the worker becomes employed he
receives a wage w and experiences a disutility from eﬀort equal to γ p e ru n i tt i m e .A s
will be made clear below, this disutility γ varies across diﬀerent worker-ﬁrm matches
and is furthermore privately observed only by the worker at the moment of contracting
over the wage. The consequences of the informational problems introduced by these
assumptions are at the heart of our contribution to the study of labor markets. Finally,
we assume that workers die according to a Poisson process with arrival rate δ that is
the same for employed and unemployed workers.
On the other side of the market, ﬁrms can recruit workers in order to produce a
ﬁnal good. In particular, each ﬁrm has only one position that, when ﬁlled by a worker,
produces one unit of the ﬁnal good, worth p, per unit time until the worker dies, in
which case the position is destroyed. If instead the position is vacant, the ﬁrm has to
pay a cost c per unit time until the position is ﬁlled. To maintain symmetry in the
modelling of the worker’s and of the ﬁrm’s problem, we assume that vacant positions
a r ed e s t r o y e dw i t ha ne x o g e n o u s l yg i v e nP o i s s o na r r i v a lr a t eδ.F i r m sa r ef r e et oe n t e r
and exit the market and will therefore open a vacancy that yields a positive expected
proﬁt and close one that yields a negative expected proﬁt. We will also discuss how
our results would be aﬀected by abandoning this assumption and solve for a model
with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms in the Appendix.
Vacancies and unemployed workers are brought together by a random (Poisson)
matching process. In particular, the total number of contacts per unit time is given by
the matching function M = am(u,v), where u and v denote the number of unemployed
workers and of open vacancies, respectively. We assume that this function is increasing,
continuous, and homogeneous of degree one in both arguments. The parameter a
captures the eﬃciency of the matching process and we are particularly interested in the
eﬀects that changes in this parameter have on the equilibrium outcome. The fact that
the matching function displays constant returns to scale allows us to write the (Poisson)
arrival rate with which a vacancy meets a worker as am(u,v)/v = am(u/v,1) = aq(θ),
where θ ≡ v/u is a variable that captures the degree of labor market ‘tightness’.
The properties of the matching function imply that q0(θ) < 0 and the elasticity of q
6with respect to θ is less than one. Analogously, we have that the arrival rate with
which an unemployed worker ﬁn d sa no p e nv a c a n c yi sam(u,v)/u = aθq(θ), and that
d(aθq(θ))/dθ>0.
The set up of the model is so far standard.5 The contracting over the wage rate that
takes place when a ﬁrm with a vacant position and an unemployed worker have met is
where our approach departs from existing literature. In particular we assume that once
aw o r k e ra n daﬁrm have met, the worker privately observes a particular realization
γ of his disutility from working at the ﬁrm. This realization is drawn from a publicly
observable distribution with cumulative function G(γ) and density function g(γ)o n
γ ∈ [0,∞) and is not correlated with the disutility that the worker might experience
working at other ﬁrms. We denote the inverse of the hazard rate by H(γ) ≡ G(γ)/g(γ)
and make the standard assumption that it is monotonically increasing.6 The ﬁrm does
not observe the realization γ and has to make a take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀer to the
worker. If this oﬀer is accepted by the worker, the position is ﬁlled, the ﬁrm receives a
product p and pays a wage w per unit time until the worker and the ﬁrm die, in which
case production stops and the position is destroyed. If instead the oﬀer is rejected
both the ﬁrm and the worker return to the search pool and wait for another match.
Having outlined the structure of the model that we use in this paper, it is worth
brieﬂy discussing the reasons for and the implications of three of our simplifying as-
sumptions. First, for most of the paper we assume a very simple bargaining game in
the presence of one-sided private information. We do so because of the simplicity of
this set up and because in many markets ﬁrms do indeed have a substantial degree
of monopsony power. In this environment with one-sided private information, the
informational ineﬃciency could be completely solved if the oﬀer were made by the
informed party, i.e. by the worker. In Section 6, however, we show that in a more
realistic environment with two-sided private information our conclusions apply also
when the parties use much more general bargaining games.7 Second, we assume that
the worker’s disutility γ is subject to a random shock only at the beginning of the
relationship and never again during the relationship. In other words, in our simpliﬁed
model, ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sm i g h tf a i lt os t a r tap r o ﬁtable working relationship upon
5It indeed follows Pissarides (2000) very closely.
6This monotone hazard rate condition is satisﬁed by a large number of common distributions.
7See also Matouschek (2004) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
7meeting but they never willingly separate after this relationship has started. This is
only a simplifying assumption and the same qualitative results that we obtain in the
present model would also be obtained in a model in which workers and ﬁrms start
their relationship with public information and experience a productivity shock later
on in their relationship.8 Finally, we assume throughout the paper that the worker’s
disutility of eﬀort, γ,i se m p l o y e r - s p e c i ﬁc. This assumption might approximate reality
quite well in labor markets in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills are very important. It also has
the merit of greatly simplifying the analysis and therefore to allow us to take a ﬁrst
step towards understanding the role played by private information in labor markets.
Before proceeding to solve the model with private information as described above,
it is useful to brieﬂy solve, analyze, and discuss thes a m em o d e li nt h ep u b l i ci n f o r -
mation case in which the worker’s disutility is observable to the ﬁrm at the moment
of contracting over the wage. Besides laying out many of the basic equations that
hold also in the private information model, the analysis of this standard case with
public information constitutes a very useful benchmark against which to evaluate the
consequences of private information.
3T h e P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n B e n c h m a r k
Consider a worker who has just met a ﬁrm with an open vacancy. Assume that the
worker experiences disutility γ from working at this particular ﬁrm and has been
oﬀered a wage w. If the worker accepts this oﬀer and becomes employed at the ﬁrm,





whereas if he rejects the oﬀer he will remain unemployed, which yields expected lifetime
utility equal to U.9 A ﬁrm that can observe the worker’s disutility γ,a si sa s s u m e d
to be the case in this section, maximizes proﬁts by oﬀering the lowest possible wage
rate w that is accepted by the worker, provided that hiring the worker at this wage is
8To yield the same results as those of our model, such a model should also allow workers to have
some bargaining power, for example by allowing them to make wage oﬀers with some probability.
Details of such an alternative model are available from the authors upon request.
9Note that, since the disutility γ is employer-speciﬁc, the expected utility of an unemployed worker
does not depend on it.
8more proﬁtable for the ﬁr mt h a nk e e p i n gt h ev a c a n c yo p e na n dw a i t i n gf o rab e t t e r
match with a new worker. Therefore, if the ﬁrm decides to hire the worker at all, it
oﬀers him a wage such that W(γ)=U,o r ,u s i n g( 1 )
w(γ)=γ +( r + δ)U. (2)
However, if the proﬁtt h a tt h eﬁrm would obtain by hiring the worker at this wage,
[p−w(γ)]/(r+δ), is less than the utility the ﬁrm could derive by keeping the vacancy
open, V , the worker is not hired. Using this fact in conjunction with the expression for
w(γ) given in (2), we therefore have that a worker-ﬁrm match is successfully formed
if and only if
γ ≤ ˆ γ ≡ p − (r + δ)S, (3)
where S ≡ U+V denotes the joint value of search to the worker and the ﬁrm. Equation
(3) implies that all mutually beneﬁcial matches are formed, a result owing to the public
availability of information assumed in this section. The probability that a ﬁrm and
a worker separate is then given by 1 − G(ˆ γ) and, for the remainder of this paper, we
refer to this probability as the extent of ‘job insecurity.’
We next turn to solving for the equilibrium value of U and V . The equilibrium
value of V is straightforward to determine since free entry ensures that it is equal to
zero. The expected utility for unemployed workers, U,s a t i s ﬁes
(r + δ)U = b + aθq(θ)[W








dG(γ)+[ 1− G(ˆ γ)]U (5)
is the expected utility of a worker who is matched but does not yet know the realization
of his disutility γ. The Bellman equation (4) can be given the usual interpretation
a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hU can be thought of as the asset value of the option to search. In
equilibrium the return on this value, rU, must be equal to the income ﬂow provided
by the asset, b, plus the expected capital gains or losses, aθq(θ)[We − U]−δU.S u b -
stituting (2) and (3) into (5) gives We = U which implies that a worker is indiﬀerent
9between being matched and realizing We and being unemployed and realizing U.T h i s
is a consequence of the assumption that the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power and
thus captures all the gains from trade. Substituting We = U into (4) then gives the
following equilibrium value of unemployment
U = b/(r + δ). (6)
The last endogenous variable for which we need to solve is θ.W e c a n d o s o b y
using the following Bellman equation for the value of a vacancy
(r + δ)V = −c + aq(θ)[J








dG(γ)+[ 1− G(ˆ γ)]V (8)
is the expected value of a ﬁrm that is matched but does not yet know whether its
wage oﬀer will be accepted. The interpretation of equation (7) is analogous to that of










which pins down the unique equilibrium level of market tightness θ and completes the
description of the equilibrium in the model with public information.
Note that in the simple model with public i n f o r m a t i o na n a l y z e di nt h i ss e c t i o n ,a
fall in labor market frictions, i.e. an increase in a,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the value of being
unemployed U or the value of an open vacancy V . This is due, respectively, to the
assumptions of monopsony power and of free entry. As a result, job insecurity and the
expected payoﬀs from being matched We and Je are also not aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s e
in a. The only change that occurs in this simple model is that more new ﬁrms enter
the market when a increases, since it is now easier for them to be matched with a
worker, and this increases market tightness.
104 The model with private information
Consider now the full model outlined in Section 2, in which the ﬁrm does not observe
the worker’s disutility γ when making the wage oﬀer. Since ﬁrms do not observe γ
they cannot make their wage oﬀe r sc o n t i n g e n to ni ta n dh a v et oo ﬀer a unique wage
w to all the workers whom they meet. As in the previous section, workers accept this
wage oﬀer w if and only if W(γ) ≥ U, or, after using equation (1), if and only if
γ ≤ ˜ γ ≡ w − (r + δ)U. (10)
The ﬁrm chooses the wage rate w in order to maximize its expected proﬁt G(˜ γ)(p−
w)/(r+δ)+[1−G(˜ γ)]V . Since (10) establishes a one-to-one relationship between the
wage rate w oﬀered by the ﬁrm and the marginal worker ˜ γ who accepts it, in order
to solve the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt maximization problem we can think of the ﬁrm




p − ˜ γ − (r + δ)U
r + δ
+[ 1− G(˜ γ)]V
The ﬁrst order condition of this problem is
˜ γ + H(˜ γ)=p − (r + δ)S, (11)
where H(γ) is the inverse of the hazard rate. Note that it would be ex post eﬃcient
for the worker and the ﬁrm to start an employment relationship whenever, γ ≤ ˆ γ,
where ˆ γ is deﬁned in (3). In the presence of private information, however, employment
relationships are formed only if γ ≤ ˜ γ. The presence of H(˜ γ) in (11) above implies that
˜ γ<ˆ γ and that ‘ineﬃcient separations’ (see Hall and Lazear (1984)) occur whenever
γ ∈ [˜ γ,ˆ γ]. The probability that a ﬁrm and a worker ineﬃciently separate is then given
by [G(ˆ γ) − G(˜ γ)] and, for the remainder of this paper, we refer to this probability as
the extent of ‘excessive job insecurity.’
Before proceeding to close the model, it is useful to discuss the implications of a
fall in market frictions for the outcome of t h ew a g eb a r g a i n i n gp r o c e s st h a tw eh a v e
just described. Note that a fall in market frictions, i.e. an increase in a,a ﬀects the
bargaining game only by increas i n gt h ej o i n tv a l u eo fs e a r c hS, as will be shown below.
11Because of the assumption that H0(γ) > 0, the ﬁrst order condition (11) implies that
an increase in the value of search S reduces ˜ γ and thus increases the degree of job
insecurity [1 − G(˜ γ)]. Essentially, an increase in S induces at least one of the agents
to adopt more aggressive bargaining strategies, i.e. the ﬁrm oﬀers a higher wage and/or
t h ew o r k e ri sm o r el i k e l yt or e j e c ta n yg i v e no ﬀer. These more aggressive bargaining
strategies lead to more separations in equilibrium. This increase in job insecurity is
‘costly’, in the sense that it has a negative eﬀect on the joint expected utility of a
ﬁrm-worker match. To see this, note that the expected utility We of a worker who is

















and the expected value Je of a ﬁrm that is matched with a worker but does not yet
know if its wage oﬀer will be accepted is given by
J
e = G(˜ γ)
p − w
r + δ
+[ 1− G(˜ γ)]V = V + G(˜ γ)
·





Adding up equations (12) and (13) we obtain the expected joint utility (We +Je)

































The ﬁrst term in (15) represents the direct marginal beneﬁto fa ni n c r e a s ei nS:
whenever the ﬁrm and the worker disagree, which happens with probability [1 − G(˜ γ)],
12they obtain a higher payoﬀ the higher is S. The second term in (15) represents the
marginal cost of an increase in S: the more aggressive bargaining leads to more job
separations, i.e. ∂˜ γ/∂S < 0, which has a negative eﬀect on the agents’ expected utility.
This is the case since it can be proved that in equilibrium ∂(We+Je)/∂˜ γ>0, i.e. the
agents trade ‘too little’. In other words, the second term represents the costs that are
associated with an increase in job insecurity, in the sense that some jointly proﬁtable
employment relationships are dissolved.10
To evaluate the total eﬀect of an increase in S on the joint expected utility of a
ﬁrm-worker match, we need to sign (15). In order to grasp the intuition behind the
signing of this derivative, it is useful to ﬁrst sign it for very large and very small values
of S, before signing it for all possible values of S.W h e nS → p/(r+δ), which happens
when a →∞ ,w eh a v et h a t˜ γ → 0 by (10). In words, when matching frictions vanish,
the agents can aﬀord to wait until the best possible match arrives, which implies that
only matches with arbitrarily small γ’s will be formed. This in turn implies that
G(˜ γ) → 0i n( 1 5 )a n dt h e r e f o r et h a td ( We + Je)/dS>0. The joint welfare of a
ﬁrm-worker match is therefore always increasing in S when S is very large to start
with. The intuition behind this result is as follows. When S is large, the gains from
trading with the current counterpart are not very large, since it is easy to ﬁnd another
counterpart if trade were to break down with the current one. This also means that
there is a high probability that the agents fail to agree and that they have to resort
to searching the market again, which makes an increase in S very beneﬁcial for them.
On the other hand, when a = 0 no match ever takes place so that S reaches its
lower bound b/(r+δ)a n d˜ γ reaches its upper bound ˜ γ0, where, using (11), ˜ γ0 is given
by ˜ γ0 + H(˜ γ0)=( p − b). Note that ˜ γ0 is higher the greater (p − b) is, i.e. the greater
10It is worth pointing out that in a standard model with public information as the one discussed
in Section 3 an increase in S also leads to more job insecurity, as can be seen from the fact that (3)
implies a negative relationship between ˆ γ and S. However, in the case of public information, such an
increase in job insecurity is not costly for the ﬁrm and the worker, since the employment relationships











=[ 1− G(b γ)].
The direct marginal beneﬁto fa ni n c r e a s ei nS,c a p t u r e db yt h eﬁrst term above, remains the same
as in the private information case. It is also still the case that ∂ˆ γ/∂S < 0, but we now have that in
equilibrium ∂(We + Je)/∂ˆ γ = 0, i.e. the marginal employment relationship has no value. The latter
result is simply an application of the envelope theorem, since (We + Je) is maximized at ˆ γ in the
public information case.
13the net marginal product of a worker is. This is because when production is very
valuable the parties are more likely to form any given match, which implies a large
˜ γ0. Inspection of (15) reveals that when ˜ γ0 i sl a r g ew eh a v ed ( We + Ue)/dS<0a t
S = b/(r + δ)( o ra = 0). In other words, if (p − b)i ss u ﬃciently large, it can be the
case that the joint expected utility of matched workers and ﬁr m si sd e c r e a s i n gi nS at
low values of S. The logic behind this result is analogous, mutatis mutandis,t ot h a t
presented for the case in which S → p/(r+δ)( o ra →∞ ); when a is small and (p−b)
is large agents are very likely to trade when they meet, implying that they are unlikely
to have to search the market because of trade breakdowns. Therefore the increase in
the value of search caused by the increase in a does not beneﬁt the agents very much,
but has a negative eﬀect on their trading probabilities. This negative eﬀect is all the
more damaging the more valuable trade is, i.e. the larger (p − b)i s . T h e r e f o r ea n
increase in the eﬀectiveness of the matching technology can decrease the joint welfare
of a worker-ﬁrm pair when the matching technology is ineﬃcient to start with and
(p − b) is large.
We furthermore note that the second derivative of (We + Je)w i t hr e s p e c tt oS is
d2(We + Je)
dS2 = g(˜ γ)
½
H(˜ γ)H00(˜ γ)
[1 + H0(˜ γ)]2 −






Since d˜ γ/dS<0, we have that, provided that H00(˜ γ) is not too positive, the term
in brackets is negative and hence (We + Je)i sc o n v e xi nS and thus quasi-convex
in a by the monotonicity of S(a). The assumption that H00(˜ γ) is not too positive is
not overly restrictive, and is for example satisﬁed by the uniform and the exponential
distributions, for which H00(γ) = 0. Figure 1 represents a case in which (p − b)i s
large and H00(˜ γ) is not too positive, so that (We + Je) is decreasing for small S and
everywhere convex in S. We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows:
Result 1 The joint expected utility of a worker-ﬁrm match, (We + Je),i sd e c r e a s i n g
in the joint value of search, S,i fS is small relative to the net marginal product, (p−b),
and is increasing in S if S is large relative to (p − b). Under mild assumptions about
the distribution of γ, (We + Je) is convex in S.
It is also of some interest to look at the distributional consequences of changes
in U and V considered separately. Diﬀerentiation of (12) and (13) shows that We is
14increasing in U and decreasing in V while Je is increasing in V and decreasing in U.
This is intuitive since it simply says that the payoﬀ that an agent expects to realize
i nt h ew a g eb a r g a i n i n gg a m ei si n c r e a s i n gi nh i sd i s a g r e e m e n tp a y o ﬀ and decreasing
in that of the potential trading partner. Since, as we will see below, a fall in labor
market frictions increases U and, because of the free entry assumption, does not change
V this immediately implies that matched workers always beneﬁt from a fall in labor
market frictions while matched ﬁrms always lose. Note, however, that this particular
result depends crucially on the free entry assumption which ensures that ﬁrms with
open vacancies do not beneﬁt from an increase in a.I nA p p e n d i xAw es h o wt h a ti f
the number of ﬁrms is taken as given, as it might be in the short run, a fall in labor
market frictions increases both U and V and, through this channel, can make matched
workers worse oﬀ and matched ﬁrms better oﬀ.11 All the other results of the model in
Appendix A are exactly as in the present version of the model with free entry.
Having established how changes in the joint value S of search for a ﬁrm-worker
pair aﬀect ˜ γ and (We + Je), we now close the model and in so doing establish the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and the fact, which has been assumed to
hold so far, that dS/da>0. The ﬁrst thing to note is that the equilibrium value of a
vacancy is equal to zero by free entry of ﬁr m s .T h ef a c tt h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u mV =0 ,a n d
thus S = U, allows us to represent the problem graphically in (U,θ)s p a c e ,w h i c hw e
do in Figure 2. Equations (11) and (12) imply that (We −U)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nS = U.
Using this fact in (4) provides a continuous and increasing relationship between U
and θ which is represented by the AA curve in Figure 2. Analogously, equations (11)
and (13) imply that (Je − V )i sd e c r e a s i n gi nS = U. Using this fact in (7) provides
a continuous and decreasing relationship between U and θ which is represented by
the JJ curve in Figure 2. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is then
established in a straightforward manner by inspection of Figure 2.
Furthermore, we can use this graphical apparatus to study the eﬀects on the equi-
librium of changes in a. As can be seen in Figure 3, an increase in a shifts the JJ
curve upward and the AA curve downward. This has ambiguous eﬀects on the equi-
librium value of θ but causes an unambiguous increase in the equilibrium value of U.
11In particular, a fall in labor market frictions will make a matched worker worse oﬀ if his expected
gains from trade We − U are small relative to the total gains from trade We + Je − U − V and it
makes the matched ﬁrm worse oﬀ if its expected gains from trade are small relative to the total gains
from trade.
15In other words, Figure 3 conﬁrms the intuitive fact that an exogenous improvement in
the eﬀectiveness of the matching technology a increases the equilibrium value U of un-
employment for workers and, given that V = 0, the joint value of search S = U.T h i s
in turn implies that workers become more selective and that the equilibrium value of ˜ γ
decreases, as shown by (11), with the consequence that the probability G(˜ γ)t h a ta n y
worker-ﬁrm match successfully leads to stable employment and production decreases.
In this sense an improvement in the eﬀectiveness of the matching technology a can
lead to an increase in instability in the labor market. We have therefore established
the following:
Result 2 A fall in labor market frictions, i.e. an increase in a, increases the joint
value of search, S,a n dl e a d st oac o s t l yi n c r e a s ei nj o bi n s e c u r i t y .I fa is initially small
relative to the marginal product, (p−b), ﬁrms and workers are made jointly worse oﬀ
by an increase in a.I fi n s t e a da is initially large relative to (p−b), ﬁrms and workers
are made jointly better oﬀ by an increase in a.
We have observed above that, by increasing S, a fall in labor market frictions leads
to more job insecurity, i.e. it increases the probability of separation [1 − G(e γ)]. We
conclude this section by analyzing the implications of a fall in labor market frictions
for the extent of excessive job insecurity, i.e. for the probability that a ﬁrm and a
worker separate although it would be ex post eﬃcient for them to form an employment
relationship. Recall that in this model with private information, ineﬃcient separations
occur whenever γ ∈ [e γ,b γ], where e γ and b γ are deﬁned in (11) and (3), respectively. Note











Since S is monotonically increasing in a, this implies that a fall in labor market
frictions reduces the range [e γ,b γ]i nw h i c hi n e ﬃcient separations take place. To see
when the reduction in this range translates into a reduction in the probability of
ineﬃcient separation, [G(b γ) − G(e γ)], consider
d[G(b γ) − G(e γ)]
dS
= −(r + δ)
·





16Therefore a suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o raf a l li nl a b o rm a r k e tf r i c t i o n st ol e a dt oa
reduction in the degree of excessive job insecurity is g(b γ) ≥ g(e γ). This condition is
satisﬁed for a number of common distributions, including uniform and exponential
distributions. Moreover, this condition is satisﬁed for any unimodal distribution for
suﬃciently large S (or equivalently a). Essentially, when labor markets work suf-
ﬁciently well further reductions in labor market frictions unambiguously reduce the
degree of excessive job insecurity. We summarize these ﬁndings as follows:
Result 3 For a number of common distributions, including uniform and exponential
distributions, a reduction in labor market frictions reduces the degree of excessive job
insecurity. For any unimodal distribution, a reduction in labor market frictions reduces
the degree of excessive job insecurity if labor market frictions are initially suﬃciently
low.
5 Self-Imposed Rigidities
We now investigate the organizational response of ﬁrms to a fall in labor market fric-
tions. To do so we extend the model of Section 2 by assuming that, upon being
matched and before any private information is revealed, a ﬁrm and a worker can con-
tract over the extra costs that they incur in case they separate in the future and we
refer to these costs as ‘self-imposed rigidities’.12 There are a number of ways in which
ﬁrms and workers can, and do, structure their employment relationship to inﬂuence
the costs of future separations. For instance, separation between a ﬁrm and a worker
will be much less costly if the worker is employed as an independent contractor than if
he is employed as a full time employee. Employer-provided pension plans are another
way in which the cost of future separation can be inﬂuenced, since the beneﬁts of a
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan are typically reduced if the worker changes jobs while
the beneﬁts of a deﬁned contribution plan are not aﬀected by job changes (Friedberg
and Webb (2003)). The observation that ﬁrms often deliberately impose rigidities on
their relationships with employees has also been made in the management literature.
In the context of Japan, for instance, Dore (1996) states that “What was not always
recognized [...] was the importance of self-imposed rigidities, most fully exempliﬁed in
12Matouschek and Ramezzana (2003) present an analysis of exclusive contracts between sellers and
buyers in a matching market that shares many of the features of the model discussed in this section.
17the Japanese ﬁrm. By self-imposed rigidities, I mean the acceptance, by managers,
of a wide range of constraints on their freedom of action - lifetime employment guar-
antees, tight seniority constraints on promotion, acceptance of the need to engineer
consent, to maintain close consultation with employees or their unions [...].” In this
section we show that if future wage bargaining takes place in the presence of private
information it may indeed be optimal for ﬁrms and workers to make separation more
costly, by imposing additional rigidities on their relationship. We show that an im-
provement in the labor market, due to a fall in search frictions, can lead to a one oﬀ
reorganization in which ﬁrms and workers switch from rigid to ﬂexible employment
relationships and that this reorganization can lead to a large increase in job insecurity
and unemployment.
Reconsider the model from Section 2 and suppose that upon being matched, but
before any private information is revealed, the ﬁrm and the worker can contract over
the level of self-imposed rigidities. In particular, they can contract over the additional
cost x ∈ [0,x]t h a tt h eﬁrm incurs in case their relationship breaks down, that is in
case they disagree on the wage. We assume that the ﬁrm and the worker Nash bargain
over x and that they have equal bargaining power.13 The transfer that the ﬁrm pays
the worker at the contracting stage is denoted by t. Finally, assume that H00(γ)i s
n o tt o op o s i t i v e ,i nt h es e n s et h a t( 1 6 )i sp o s i t i v e ,s ot h a t( We + Je)i sc o n v e xi nt h e
joint value of the outside option. The rest of the model is exactly as described in the
Section 2.
Suppose that a ﬁrm and a worker are matched and bargain over x. Since they are
risk neutral and not liquidity constrained they agree on the level of x that maximizes
their joint expected surplus. Following the same analysis as in the previous section









dG(γ)+[ 1− G(e γ)](S − x), (19)
where e γ solves the ﬁrst order condition
13The assumption that the ﬁrm and the worker have equal bargaining power is not crucial. Our
results generalize to any distribution of bargaining power.
18e γ + H(e γ)=p − (r + δ)(S − x). (20)
As can be seen with the help of Figure 1, the convexity of (We + Je) implies that
when the agents can manipulate the sum of their outside options by choosing x for
any given S,t h e ya l w a y sw a n tt oe i t h e rs e tx =0o rx =¯ x. Furthermore, the optimal
organizational choice is for them to do the former if S is suﬃciently large and to do
the latter otherwise. Speciﬁcally, let ˜ S be that value of S at which Je +We evaluated
at x =0i st h es a m ea sJe + We evaluated at x = x. Then there exists a unique ˜ S





x if S ≥ ˜ S,
0o t h e r w i s e .
(21)
A simple, intuitive proof of this result is given by looking at Figure 4, which
represents We + Je as a function of S for x =0( t h el e f t m o s tc u r v e )a n df o rx =¯ x
(the rightmost curve). Notice that the latter is simply the horizontal translation of
the former by a distance ¯ x. There is a unique ˜ S at which the two curves intersect.
Furthermore, for S<˜ S the joint value of the pair is higher for x =¯ x than for x =0 ,
whereas the opposite is true for S>˜ S.
Since, as we show formally below, a reduction in search frictions, i.e. an increase
in a,i n c r e a s e sS monotonically, it follows that when a grows above a certain threshold
˜ a we have a one oﬀ reorganization in which the ﬁrms and the workers switch from a
rigid relationship with x = x to a ﬂexible one with x = 0 and that this reorganization
leads to a large, discrete increase in the probability of separation, i.e. to a discrete
fall in ˜ γ. The intuition behind this result is as follows. On the one hand, self-imposed
rigidities make it more costly for the ﬁrm and the worker to separate, which happens
with positive probability in equilibrium. On the other hand, however, precisely because
they make separation more costly, they also induce less aggressive bargaining strategies
which makes ineﬃcient separations less likely. It follows from (21) that the beneﬁto f
self-imposed rigidities dominate the costs if S is small and that the opposite holds
if S is large. The reason is that, when S is small, it is very costly for the ﬁrm and
the worker to disagree and therefore they make sure that this does not happen by
adopting inﬂexible arrangements. In this sense self-imposed rigidities complement the
19rigidities caused by the existence of market frictions. If, however, S is suﬃciently
large, then searching the market is a suﬃciently attractive option, the worker and the
ﬁrm are hence likely to disagree often, and are not willing to bear the costs of self-
imposed rigidities. As we have already mentioned above, this reorganization does not
happen gradually but instead takes place instantly, leading to a discrete increase in
job insecurity. This is an interesting result in light of the evidence, brieﬂy discussed
in the introduction, that organizational changes in the 1990s may have contributed to
a structural increase in job insecurity for some groups of workers.
T h ef a c tt h a tw h e na,a n dt h u sS, increases above a certain threshold, ˜ γ,a n dt h u s
the probability of agreement, jumps downward has some interesting consequences for
the unemployment rate. The steady state equilibrium level of the unemployment rate





Note that equation (22) is the Beveridge curve that relates the number of unem-
ployed workers u to the number of vacancies v (see, e.g., Pissarides, 2000). The eﬀects
of an increase in a on u are in general ambiguous, as an increase in a increases the
rate at which ﬁrms and workers meet, i.e. aθq(θ), but it also decreases the probability
G(˜ γ) that any given match is successful. However, when a crosses the threshold at
which ﬁrms switch from inﬂexible to ﬂexible employment relationships, we have the
following discontinuity in the behavior of the unemployment rate.
Result 4 A fall in labor market frictions, i.e. an increase in a above ˜ a,l e a d st oao n e
oﬀ reorganization of the employment relationship, which changes istantly from rigid,
i.e. x =¯ x,t oﬂexible, i.e. x =0 . This reorganization causes a discrete increase in job
insecurity, i.e. a discrete increase in [1 − G(˜ γ)], and in the unemployment rate u.
14This rate is computed as follows. The dynamics of the number of unemployed workers is
˙ Nu = n − aθq(θ)G(˜ γ)Nu − δNu,w h e r en is the exogenous inﬂow of workers (all workers begin
their lives in unemployment), aθq(θ)G(˜ γ)Nu is the ﬂow of workers who ﬁnd employment and δNu
is the ﬂow of unemployed who die. The steady state number of unemployed workers is therefore
Nu = n/[aθq(θ)G(˜ γ)+δ]. Analogously, the dynamics of the number Ne of employed workers is given
by ˙ Ne = aθq(θ)G(˜ γ)Nu − δNe and their steady state number is Ne = aθq(θ)G(˜ γ)Nu/δ.T h e t o t a l
number of workers in the economy is therefore N = Nu + Ne = n/δ and the unemployment rate
u = Nu/N is as given in (22).
20The reason for this fact is that, when a grows and reaches ˜ a,˜ γ, and thus G(˜ γ),
jumps downward, whereas θ is continuous and does not jump, as proven below.
We now close the model and show that the equilibrium exists and is unique for any
value of a,t h a tS is indeed increasing in a,a n dt h a tθ is continuous in a.S i n c et h e
worker and the ﬁrm have equal bargaining power they each realize their disagreement
payoﬀ plus half the gains from trade. Thus the worker, who receives a transfer t from
the ﬁrm, obtains
W





















and the ﬁrm, that pays the worker a transfer t, obtains
J




















To solve for the equilibrium values of U,V and θ, we can proceed exactly as in the
previous section. In particular, we can again derive an expression for the expected
utility of an unemployed worker and an expression for the expected utility of a ﬁrm
with a vacancy. These expressions are now given by
(r + δ)U = b + aθq(θ)[W
e + t − U]( 2 5 )
and
(r + δ)V = −c + aq(θ)[J
e − t − V ], (26)
respectively. As in the previous section, we can use the free entry condition V =0
to represent the problem graphically in (U,θ)s p a c e . G i v e nV =0 ,e q u a t i o n( 2 3 )
implies that We + t − U is continuous and decreasing in S = U.15 Using this fact
15The fact that (We + t − U) is continuous in S = U can be seen from the ﬁr s tl i n eo f( 2 3 ) :w h e n
S reaches ˜ S we have that x changes discontinuously but (Je +We) is continuous at ˜ S, which implies
that (We + t − U) is also continuous. An analogous reasoning applies to (Je − t − V )i ne q u a t i o n
(24).
21in (25) provides a continuous and increasing relationship between U and θ which is
represented by the AA curve in Figure 2. Analogously, equation (24) implies that
(Je − t − V )i sd e c r e a s i n gi nS = U. Using this fact in (26) provides a continuous
and decreasing relationship between U and θ which is represented by the JJ curve
in Figure 2. As in Section 4, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and
t h ef a c tt h a td S/da>0 are then again established in a straightforward manner by
inspection of Figures 2 and 3. What is important to note is that θ is continuous in
a,s ot h a tw h e n˜ γ drops discretely as a consequence of the increase in a,t h e r ei sa
one oﬀ increase in unemployment, as already stated in result 4. The evolution of the
endogenous variables of the model following changes in a are visually summarized in
Figure 5.
6 Robustness
The model introduced in Section 2 provides a very simple framework to analyze ineﬃ-
cient wage bargaining in a decentralized labor market. A potential problem with this
simple framework, however, is that the ineﬃciency is not robust and depends crucially
on the assumed bargaining game.16 To address this issue we now allow for two-sided
asymmetric information between the worker and the ﬁrm. It is well known that in the
presence of two-sided asymmetric information, under fairly mild assumptions, volun-
tary bargaining is ineﬃcient for any bargaining game (see Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983)). Thus, if both the worker and the ﬁrm have some private information, and
either can opt out of the wage bargaining process, there must be ineﬃcient separations
whatever form the wage bargaining game takes. The bargaining ineﬃciency that is
central to our analysis is therefore robust to changes in the bargaining game once we
allow for two-sided asymmetric information.
Before turning to the general situation in which both the worker and the ﬁrm have
some bargaining power and both of them possess some private information, it proves
useful to start analyzing the situation in which the ﬁrm still has all the bargaining
p o w e ri na ne n v i r o n m e n tw i t ht w o - s i d e dp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n . W es h o wb e l o wt h a t
all the main results described until now continue to hold in this generalized set up.
16For instance, in our main model there would be no bargaining ineﬃciency if the worker made a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the ﬁrm.
22In Section 6.2 we brieﬂy discuss what happens if the ﬁrm and the worker play the
most eﬃcient bargaining game that maximizes their joint expected surplus (subject
to their interim participation constraints). There we refer to Matouschek (2004) and
conjecture that the main results described above hold.
6.1 Monopsony with Two-Sided Private Information
In this section we allow both ﬁrms and workers to have some private information. In
particular, we assume that, upon being matched, the ﬁrm learns the price p ∈ [p,p]o f
the good that it can produce at the same time at which the worker learns her disutility
γ ∈ [γ,γ]. It is convenient, but not crucial for the results, to assume that the supports
are inﬁnite, i.e. p,γ→− ∞and p,γ →− ∞ . The worker’s disutility and the price of
the ﬁrm’s good are independently drawn from distributions with respective cumulative
density functions G(γ)a n dF(p). We continue to denote the inverse of the worker’s
hazard rate by H(γ) ≡ G(γ)/g(γ) and denote the inverse of the ﬁrm’s hazard rate by
K(p) ≡ [1 − F(p)]/f(p). We assume that the density functions are continuous and
strictly positive and that the distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate conditions
H0(γ) ≥ 0f o ra l lγ and K0(p) ≤ 0 for all p.
As in the model of Section 2, we continue to assume that at the ex post bargaining
stage the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power. In particular, we assume that the bargain-
ing game that the ﬁrm and the worker play to determine the wage maximizes the ﬁrm’s
expected surplus subject to the ‘interim participation constraint’ that the worker and
the ﬁrm, after having learned their private information, prefer to participate in the
bargaining game to searching for an alternative trading partner.17
The Revelation Principle (see, for example, Myerson (1991)) allows us to restrict
the analysis, without loss of generality, to Bayesian incentive compatible direct mech-
anisms. Suppose then that, after having learned p and γ,t h eﬁrm and the worker
make announcements b p and b γ. A direct mechanism speciﬁes the probability of trade
q(b γ,b p) and expected wage payment w(b γ,b p) as a function of these announcements. The
wage bargaining game maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected surplus subject to the worker’s
participation constraint. Thus, it is described by the solution to
17In the absence of private information the corresponding bargaining game would have the ﬁrm












subject to the interim participation and incentive compatibility constraints.18 The
following lemma follows immediately from Williams (1987) and describes the optimal
trading rule that solves the maximization problem (27).






1 if γ + H(γ) ≤ p − (r + δ)S
0 otherwise.
Proof: This lemma follows immediately from Theorem 5 in Williams (1987) and we
refer to his analysis. Besides the obvious notational diﬀerences, note that he refers to
the seller’s reservation price as v1 which, in our notation, is given by γ/(r + δ)+U.
Also, he refers to the buyer’s reservation price as v2 which, in our notation, is given
by p/(r + δ) − V. ¥
Note that the optimal trading rule implies that wage bargaining is ineﬃcient.
Thus, just as in the main model, a ﬁrm and a worker sometimes separate although it
would be eﬃcient for them to stay together. Also, it is again the case that an increase
in the aggregate disagreement payoﬀ has an ambiguous eﬀe c to nt h ej o i n te x p e c t e d
surplus of a ﬁrm-worker match
J
e + W









On the one hand it increases the payoﬀ that the ﬁrm and the worker realize when-
ever they separate but, on the other hand, it also increases the probability of separa-
tion. To see when either eﬀect dominates, note that e γ is still implicitly deﬁned by
18The incentive compatibility constraints ensure that each manager ﬁnds it optimal to make truthful
announcements of his or her type and the interim individual rationality constraints ensure that,
after learning their type, the managers prefer participating in the bargaining game to realizing the
disagreement payoﬀs.
24(11) and trade still takes place if and only if γ ≤ e γ.D i ﬀerentiating Je + We with



















The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is equal to the probability 1−Eγ,p[q(γ,p,S)]
that trade does not take place. Thus it represents the positive eﬀect of an increase in
S,n a m e l yt h a tt h eﬁrm and the worker get a higher payoﬀ whenever they disagree.
T h es e c o n dt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d er e p r e s e n t st h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of an increase in
S that is due to the reduction in the probability of trade. For arbitrarily small S the
ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eg o e st oz e r os oa ni n c r e a s ei nS reduces the expected
joint surplus while for arbitrarily large S t h es e c o n dt e r mg o e st oz e r os ot h a ta n
increase in S increases the expected joint surplus. Diﬀerentiating again with respect
to S shows that Je + We is convex in S as long as H00(γ) is not too positive. This
is the case, for instance, for uniform and exponential distributions. Recall that the
simple bargaining game in the model of Section 2 had exactly the same implications.
For the general equilibrium analysis it is also useful to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The expected gains from trade for a worker We−U and the expected gains
from trade for a ﬁrm Je − V depend on the aggregate disagreement payoﬀ S and not




d(Je − V )
dS
≤ 0.
Proof: In Appendix B. ¥
To solve the model we now need to determine the equilibrium values of U, V ,a n d
θ. Once again free entry ensure that V = 0 so that the Bellman equations for the
value of search for workers and ﬁrms ( 4) and (7) can again be solved for the unique
U and θ. To see this note that, because of Lemma 2, the right hand side of the two
Bellman equations are decreasing in U, just as they were in the main model. Thus,
(4) implies a negative relationship between U and θ and ( 7) a positive one so that
the two equations can be solved for the unique equilibrium values of U and θ.T h e
25two equations also imply that an increase in a leads to an increase in U and has an
ambiguous eﬀect on θ.
All the main results in the previous sections are driven by two features of the basic
model. First, Je +We is decreasing in S for small S and increasing for large S and it
is convex in S as long as the H00(γ) is not ‘too positive.’ Second, an improvement in
the matching technology increases S in equilibrium. Since this extended model with
two-sided asymmetric information has exactly the same features all the results that we
d e r i v e di nt h em a i nm o d e la l s oh o l di nt h ec u r r e n ts e tu p .W et h e r e f o r ec o n c l u d et h a t
the results of the main model are robust to the introduction of two-sided asymmetric
i n f o r m a t i o na sl o n ga st h eﬁrm continues to be a monopsonist.
6.2 Optimal Bargaining with Two-Sided Private Information
T h r o u g h o u tt h ea n a l y s i sw eh a v ea s s u m e dt hat the wage bargaining game is exoge-
nously given and that the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power. In other words, we have
assumed that the ﬁrm is a monopsonist. We have made this assumption because we
believe that it is a useful benchmark which is relevant in many settings.19 However,
i ti sa ni n t e r e s t i n gq u e s t i o nt oa s kw h a tw o u l dh a p p e ni no u rs e tu pi ft h eﬁrm and
the worker could in advance contract over the wage bargaining game. In particular,
it would be interesting to know whether, in this case, an improvement in the outside
option could still be harmful to the worker and the ﬁrm and whether they would still
have an incentive to impose rigidities on their own relationship.
Reconsider then the model presented in the previous section but suppose that the
ﬁrm and the worker can contract over the wage bargaining game before any private
information is revealed. Since they are both risk neutral and liquidity unconstrained
they choose the bargaining game that maximizes their joint expected surplus subject
to the interim participation constraint. In other words they agree to play the Myerson-
Satterthwaite (1983) bargaining game. In a recent paper Matouschek (2004) shows
that in this bargaining game an increase in the sum of the players’ disagreement payoﬀs
has an ambiguous eﬀect on their expected joint surplus since it increases the payoﬀ they
get in case of disagreement but also reduces the probability of agreement, just as in the
19Note that once one allows for private information monopsony power by the ﬁr m sd o e sn o ti m p l y
that they can extract all the rents and push the workers down to their reservation utilities. Essentially,
private information partially protects the workers from the ﬁrms’ monopsony power. Note also that
all our results hold if we assume that the worker has all the bargaining power.
26model above. Moreover, he shows that for certain common distributions, in particular
the standard uniform, standard normal and standard exponential distribution, the
expected joint surplus is quasi-convex in the sum of the disagreement payoﬀs. Since
it is the quasi-convexity of the expected joint surplus that drives the results described
in this paper we conjecture that these results would also hold in a speciﬁcation of the
model in which the wage bargaining game is endogenized.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that if wage negotiations between ﬁrms and workers are
hampered by the presence of private information a reduction in labor market frictions
leads to a costly increase in job insecurity. This adverse insecurity eﬀect of a fall in
labor market frictions can be so large that ﬁrms and workers who are in an employment
relationship can be made worse oﬀ by it. In contrast, unemployed workers are always
made better oﬀ by such a fall in labor market frictions. We then endogenize the
organizational structure of the employment relationship and show that a fall in labor
market frictions induces a one oﬀ reorganization in which ﬁrms and workers switch
from a very rigid employment relationship to a very ﬂexible one. This reorganization
leads to a large, one oﬀ increase in job insecurity and unemployment.
Throughout our analysis we maintain one simplifying assumption, namely that all
uncertainty is match speciﬁc. This assumption is realistic if workers’ ﬁrm speciﬁc
skills are very important. We believe that it would be interesting to investigate if our
results continues to hold in a model in which ﬁrm and worker types are correlated
across matches and leave this analysis for future work.
27Appendix A
Fixed number of ﬁrms in the short-run
In this section we brieﬂy discuss how some of the results of the model with free entry of
ﬁrms considered in the main text would change if the number of ﬁrms were exogenously
given. We anticipate that the only qualitatively new result is that, diﬀerently from
what happened in the free entry model, in this section matched workers can be made
worse oﬀ and matched ﬁrms can be made better oﬀ by an increase in a.I n t h e f r e e
entry case, in which V =0 ,a ni n c r e a s ei na necessarily improved the bargaining
position of matched workers vis-` a-vis ﬁrms and thus redistributed surplus towards
them. However, with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, V is also increasing in a and the relative
bargaining positions of workers and ﬁrms are aﬀected in a much less clear-cut way. It is
therefore possible that We decreases and Je increases in a. Except for this diﬀerence,
the rest of the qualitative results obtained in the main text continues to hold also with
a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms.
Assume that there is an exogenously given inﬂow of ﬁrms per unit time. To simplify
things assume that this inﬂow is equal to x and is therefore the same as that of workers.
This implies that, since workers also leave unemployment and ﬁrms ﬁll vacancies at
the same rate, the steady state number of unemployed workers and vacancies is the
same and thus θ =1 .N o r m a l i z i n gq(1) = 1 workers and ﬁrms face therefore the same
exogenously given matching rate a.20
The equilibrium of the model is now given by equations (11), (4), (7), (12), and
(13) with θ = q(θ)=1 . 21 Adding (12) and (13) one obtains
W
e + J









Adding (4) and (7) (computed at θ = 1) one also obtains
20If the inﬂow of ﬁrms were exogenously given but not equal to that of workers, than θ would be
endogenous and determined by the dynamics of the number of unemployed workers and vacancies.
Enodgenizing θ would, however, considerably complicate the analysys without adding much insight,
and here we limit ourselves to the equal inﬂows case.
21In what follows we always refer to the equations in the main text evaluated at θ = q(θ) = 1, even
though we do not mention this explicitly every time.
28(r + δ)S = b − c + a(W
e + J
e − S). (29)
Combining (28) and (29) we have









Since the left hand side of (30) is increasing in S and, given the negative relationship
between ˜ γ and S implied by (11), the right hand side is decreasing in S, there exists
a unique equilibrium value of S. Inspection of (30) also reveals that an increase
in a determines an increase in S and, by (11), a decrease in ˜ γ. These results are
qualitatively identical to those obtained in the main text with free entry of ﬁrms. So
is the qualitative behavior of (We + Je), once we substitute S = U + V for U in (14)
and (15). However, the eﬀects of changes in a on the expected utility of a matched
worker, We, and of a matched ﬁrm, Je,c a nb ed i ﬀerent in this model from those in























To make progress we therefore need to ﬁnd dU/da and dV/da,s i n c edS/da is simply





e − U − a
G(e γ)
1+H0(e γ)
We + Je − S







e − V − aG(e γ)
We + Je − S
r + δ + z
. (34)










e − U −
G(e γ)
1+H0(e γ)
(r + δ + a)(We + Je − S)







e − V − G(e γ)
(r + δ + a)(We + Je − S)
r + δ + z
. (36)
W et h e r e f o r eh a v et h a tdWe/da > 0i fa n do n l yi f
We − U




r + δ + a
r + δ + z
(37)
and dJe/da > 0 if and only if
Je − V
We + Je − S
>G (e γ)
r + δ + a
r + δ + z
(38)
Note that although (37) and (38) do not yet give conditions only in terms of
exogenous parameters, they are nevertheless very useful to understand intuitively when
agents are more likely to loose or gain from improvements in the matching technology.
Condition (37) implies that a matched worker is likely to gain from an increase in a if
(We−U)/(We+Je−S) is large. This is the case if the worker has a strong bargaining
position, i.e. if he is able to appropriate a large share of the surplus generated by the
match with the ﬁrm. If instead the worker is in a weak bargaining position, then an
increase in a can actually make him worse oﬀ. An analogous interpretation applies to
the condition for ﬁrms given in (38).
Appendix B
Robustness
Deﬁnition: For the lemmas below it is useful to introduce the following deﬁnitions:
qw(γ) ≡ Ep[q(γ,p)], qf(p) ≡ Eγ[q(γ,p)],
ww(γ) ≡ Ep[t(γ,p)], wf(p) ≡ Eγ[t(γ,p)],
30Lemma 3 A mechanism (q(·),w(·)) is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if














Proof: Since the proof is well known we omit it to save space. ¥
Lemma 4 A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism (q(·),w(·)) satisﬁes
W
e(γ)+J
e(p) − S = Eγ,p[(p − γ − S − K(p) − H(γ))q(γ,p)].
Proof: Since the proof is well known we omit it to save space. ¥
Lemma 5 The optimal trading rule q(γ,p,S) satisﬁes
Eγ,p[(p − γ − S − K(p) − H(γ))q(γ,p,S)] = 0.
Proof: Since the proof is well known we omit it to save space. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2i nt h et e x t :












Taking expectations and rearranging then gives
W














From Lemma 1 it follows that right hand side of each equation depends on S and not
on the distribution of U and V . Furthermore, it follows from the same lemma that
the right hand side of each equation is decreasing in S. ¥
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Figure 1: Expected joint utility of a worker-ﬁrm pair.
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Figure 3: Relationship between S = U and a.
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Figure 4: Optimal choice of x.
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Figure 5: Evolution of endogenous variables following changes in a.
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